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2 broken by climate change to the digital and virtual futures produced by various possible technologies.
Ideal moral outlook utilitarianism.
I first outline my approach to utilitarianism (Mulgan 2001 (Mulgan , 2006 (Mulgan , 2007 (Mulgan , 2015d . I begin with a simplified contrast between two strands in the utilitarian tradition. Act utilitarianism says that the right act in any situation is whatever produces the best consequences. Act utilitarianism is notoriously demanding, alienating, and counterintuitive. It is also inadequate for contemporary environmental problems, which can only be understood collectively. (It makes little sense to ask what I should do about climate change.) Rule utilitarians seek a moderate, liberal alternative to act utilitarianism. They picture morality as a collective enterprise, and evaluate moral codes by their collective impact on human well-being. For rule utilitarians, the fundamental moral questions are: 'What if we did that?', and 'How should we live?' I develop a new theory based on Brad Hooker's recent rule utilitarianism (Hooker 2000; Mulgan 2001 Mulgan , 53-103, 2006 . Any rule utilitarian theory consists of two stages. We first identify the ideal moral code, and then we assess acts indirectly: the right act is the act that would be performed by someone who had internalised the ideal code. My main concern in this paper is the first stage: identifying the ideal code.
Although 'rule utilitarianism' is now the established name, it is misleading. Talk of 'rules' and 'codes' is distracting. I focus instead on the Ideal Moral Outlook (IMO), and therefore on Ideal Moral Outlook Utilitarianism (IMOU). This more cumbersome name leaves open whether the utilitarian ideal is a code of rules, a set of dispositions, a package of virtues, a set of priorities, a general moral outlook, or (as seems most likely) some combination of these.
The IMO is the outlook that best promotes human well-being. But a moral outlook on its own cannot promote anything. We must first map candidate outlooks onto specific possible futures, and then rank those possible futures using our preferred utilitarian value function. IMOU ranks competing moral outlooks by asking what would happen if we (the present generation) attempted to teach that outlook to the next generation.
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The ideal outlook is the best one for us to teach to them. This sets aside the cost of changing existing moral beliefs, but factors-in the cost of (for instance) trying to get a new generation to accept a very demanding ethic.
IMOU includes several vague terms: 'best', 'us', 'teach', 'next generation'. Our next task is to cash these out. Contemporary moral philosophy offers many ways to evaluate states of affairs (e.g., Parfit 1984, 351-454; Broome 2004 ). Should we consider actual consequences, objective expected value, or subjective expected value?
Should we maximise or satisfice? Should we give priority to the worst-off, to people near some significant threshold of well-being or lexical level, to basic needs, to human rights? Should we be risk averse -giving priority to avoiding especially bad results? Should we discount the future or be temporally impartial? How should we aggregate the well-being of individuals within a population: total utilitarianism, average utilitarianism, diminishing marginal view, lexical view, critical level view?
Should we give direct weight to factors other than well-being -such as distribution, equality, desert, rights, justice, ideal goods, etc?
In theory, IMOU could incorporate any package of views about value and aggregation. I take the simplest option: asking what maximises expected total wellbeing. I offer three justifications. First, IMOU's distinctive features emerge most clearly if we eschew eccentric views about value, aggregation, or risk-aversion.
Second, maximising expected total utility is the default starting-point in the contemporary literature and has many theoretical advantages over its rivals (Broome 2004 ). Finally, I argue elsewhere that the most common (and most compelling) objections to 'total utilitarianism' are really objections to the combination of total utilitarianism and a particular (extreme) account of right action: namely, act consequentialism (Mulgan 2006, 55-81) . Combined with act consequentialism, total utilitarianism makes extreme demands. But act consequentialism is equally counterintuitive whatever its axiology. Total utilitarianism is much more palatable when incorporated into IMOU.
One issue for all collective consequentialists is scope (Hooker 2000, 169-174; Mulgan 2001, 53-103; Kahn 2012) . Does 'we' include all rational agents at all times, or some proper subset of them, or even all possible rational agents? Competing desiderata 4 point in different directions. On the one hand, wider scope increases the distance between collective consequentialism and act consequentialism -thereby enhancing whatever comparative advantages drew us to collective consequentialism in the first place. (For instance, wider scope typically means less onerous demands (Hooker 2000, 169-174) .) Also, any particular restricted scope looks arbitrary. Why restrict our attention to only those rational agents? Why draw the line exactly there?
On the other hand, universal scope threatens to make collective consequentialism unwieldy, indeterminate, and impractical. How could we ever know what it will be best for all rational agents to do? Is there even any fact of the matter to be discovered?
Wider scope also exacerbates familiar worries about 'rule worship' (Hooker 2000, 93-99) . Why think that the appropriate thing for me to do is to follow a rule that would only bring good consequences if it were followed by countless billions of others who will never actually do so?
In this paper, I largely set questions of scope aside. Unless otherwise stated, 'we' includes all present adult members of a large industrial society. Scope is a general difficulty for any collective consequentialism, not a specific problem for IMOU.
IMOU can borrow the best rule utilitarian solution, whatever that turns out to be, with one exception. Given its emphasis on teaching the next generation, IMOU insists that 'we' can only include present adults: it cannot include future people.
We aim to identify the IMO. Scope only matter if it affects which outlook is best. In many cases, disambiguation is unnecessary because the same outlook comes out best whoever 'we' are. This follows from another feature of rule utilitarianism that IMOU shares: pervasive uncertainty. We cannot hope to specify the IMO in any detail. At most, we can identify some of its general features. But often that is enough. We might, for instance, be confident that the IMO does not support gratuitous torture, even if we don't know exactly what it says about other issues. Similarly, we might be confident that different scopes deliver the same moral outlook. It is unlikely that all human beings would do best to encourage torture while everyone in our society does best by avoiding it! IMOU begins with a simple question, and then allows complexity to emerge empirically, because the answer to that simple question depends on facts about human nature and about our ability to teach or learn moral codes. Our central question is timeless in its formulation, but context-specific in its application.
IMOU is distinctive in the recent rule utilitarian literature. I argue that it has four main advantages over its rivals. (Rawls 1971, 178) no longer apply, and our affluent way of life is no longer an option (Mulgan 2011 (Mulgan , 2014a (Mulgan , 2015a (Mulgan , 2015c (Mulgan , 2015d (Mulgan , 2016a (Mulgan , 2016b . This is a credible future. No-one can reasonably be confident that it won't happen.
When we teach our ideal code to the next generation, we must consider the possibility that they (or their descendents) will inhabit a broken world. But then our two presuppositions no longer hold. Distant future people may be worse-off because of what we have done to their environment.
While rule utilitarianism has hitherto largely ignored the future, IMOU forces us to think directly about the situation of the next generation; and also indirectly about their impact on later generations. IMOU thus counteracts our natural human tendency toward temporal myopia, thereby making us much more likely to give intergenerational issues their due.
A number of recent developments raise the importance of future ethics. (Consider threats such as climate change, resource depletion, over-population, dangerous technological acceleration, etc.) These developments thus also increase the appeal of IMOU. One central moral task for all utilitarians is to equip future people for the moral challenges they will face. IMOU highlights the fact that teaching a moral outlook to future people is the most important thing we do.
Towards an intergenerational utilitarianism.
We need a moral theory to guide us in a world where human actions have an unprecedented long-term impact on the natural environment. Utilitarianism has a distinct advantage in this challenging new territory, because it presupposes neither optimistic convergence nor environmental stability, and easily absorbs new information about the future. (Utilitarianism thus contrasts favourably with Rawlsian liberalism, for instance, which explicitly limits itself to favourable conditions where optimistic convergence holds true.)
When thinking about the future, rule utilitarians must first ask the right question. One mistake would be to try to discover the moral code of distant future people -asking how they will live, and then seeking to emulate them. This makes for great science fiction, but not for credible moral philosophy or practical ethics. We cannot hope to predict the ideal distant future code. And even if we found it, that code would probably be too alien and demanding to be of any practical use to us.
Another tempting mistake is to ask what code would provide the best results if it were followed from the present day into the distant future. This presumes that one single moral code will pass down the generations more or less intact. This is extremely implausible. It also contradicts an enduring utilitarian commitment. A central feature of Mill's utilitarianism, in particular, is his faith in empiricism and moral progress (Skorupski 1989, especially 1-47; Donner and Fumerton 2009, especially 59-60) . It may seem incongruous to speak of moral progress alongside broken futures, but there is no contradiction here (Mulgan 2015a) . Mill is not a naïve optimist about social progress. Instead, he is an empiricist who is confident that future people will know more than us about what is valuable and that future ethical inquiry might move in very surprising directions. At the very least, utilitarians should not build the absence of moral progress into their theory at the outset by assuming an unchanging moral code! (I return to moral progress in the final section of this paper.)
A third mistake -as we saw in the previous section -is to think we can simply ignore the future altogether.
We need a utilitarian question that counts distant future people equally without asking us to imagine or imitate their moral thinking, and also allows for moral change. have on later generations. After all, this is how moral education works. We teach the next generation. We cannot teach distant future people.
What is the ideal moral outlook?
We now turn -at last -to the content of the IMO. What should we teach the next generation? I begin by dismissing two simple answers. The first is that things go best if everyone always tries to maximise well-being. The IMO is the utility principle and IMOU collapses back into act utilitarianism. All rule utilitarians must deny this collapse. Otherwise they would not have a distinct theory! They cite human fallibility, partiality, and cognitive limitations to explain why utility is not maximised by teaching human beings to be single-minded utility maximisers (Hooker 2000, 93-99) .
IMOU borrows this reply.
Another simple answer is that the IMO is identical to our existing common-sense morality. Drawing on arguments made famous by Mill -and before him by William
Paley, who argued that God instituted morality to promote human well-being -rule utilitarians have long argued that the ideal code must include the familiar permissions and obligations, and the rights and freedoms, of moral common-sense. Some rule utilitarians embrace this collapse into conventional morality. For instance, Hooker argues that 'the best argument for rule consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions' (Hooker 2000, 101 ; see also Hooker 1994, 29; Miller 2000) . What rule utilitarianism adds is an explanation of why commonsense rules are correct.
Instead of following Hooker, I argue that IMOU will depart from commonsense morality in crucial areas -or at least that it offers guidance where commonsense morality is silent or confused. In particular, as I argue in the next section, the ideal moral outlook for a broken future diverges sharply from our current moral commonsense. I regard this as an objection to common-sense morality, not a problem for IMOU. Our considered moral judgements have evolved to fit our affluent world. We have no reason to expect them to be (even) prima facie reliable when we contemplate a broken future.
However, unlike the most radical act utilitarianism, IMOU also limits the potential alien-ness of the IMO, because that outlook must be taught by current human beings to a new generation of humans. Human nature is not infinitely plastic. Any plausible IMO will include familiar moral dispositions such as honesty, generosity, promisekeeping, courage, murder-aversion, and so on. People who internalise the IMO will not walk callously past children drowning in ponds, take pleasure in the sufferings of others, or reject the basic goods of human life.
Can we say more about the distinctive content of the IMO? I believe we can. Relative to our current morality, the IMO will include both a greater emphasis on benevolence towards (temporally) distant strangers; and a greater appreciation of the long-term consequences of one's actions -including greater awareness of the impact of collective actions to which one contributes. (Dale Jamieson proposes a new 'green' virtue of 'mindfulness' to capture what is needed here (Jamieson 2014, 187) .)
All utilitarians should find these two elements uncontroversial. Things will obviously go better if people think more clearly about the future. I concentrate on a more controversial and more interesting claim: that the IMO will prompt agents to think more deeply about the nature of value and morality. My third distinctive feature is a new emphasis on moral imaginativeness -especially the imagining of new moral norms suited to various possible futures. In our culture, this task is largely confined to speculative fiction. It has not been prominent in moral philosophy. In future-oriented utilitarian ethics, by contrast, imaginative moral experiments in living (to adapt a phrase from J. S. Mill) will be essential elements in everyone's moral repertoire.
We need moral imaginativeness because we are multiply uncertain about the future.
Our ignorance has three overlapping dimensions: empirical, metaphysical, and evaluative. We don't know what will happen, we don't know what the world is ultimately like, and we don't know what really matters.
In the rest of this paper, I illustrate the need for moral imaginativeness by examining three contrasting pairs of possible futures that demand different moral sensitivities. (I explore moral imaginativeness more fully in Mulgan forthcoming a)
Broken futures.
The broken world illustrates why utilitarians must think about the future. The need to think about the future clearly influences IMOU. The relevance of details about that future is less obvious. Do future people need a different moral outlook in different possible futures, or will they simply interpret the same moral outlook in different ways?
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The future is uncertain. The IMO must therefore work well across a wide range of possible futures. I will now argue that this flexible outlook differs significantly from the moral outlook it would be best to teach if we knew what particular future our descendents will face. The IMO will also therefore differ from the ideal codes of traditional rule utilitarians who (implicitly) presuppose that the future resembles the present.
Elsewhere, I explore several places where current ethical thinking must be reinterpreted for a broken future. While some specific impacts of the broken world are predictable, others are more surprising. Consider versions of naturalistic meta-ethics that identify moral facts with the end-points of processes of empirical moral inquiry that may turn out to be inextricably linked to an unsustainable way of life (Jackson 1999; Mulgan 2015b) ; or the many strands of contemporary moral philosophy built on intuitions that are very closely tied to our affluent present (Singer 1972; Thomson 1976; Mulgan 2015c) ; or theories of rights and distributive justice that implicitly presume a world where the central elements of a worthwhile life can be guaranteed to everyone (Mulgan 2011, 18-68; 2016a) . These familiar ethical ideas must all be reimagined to fit a broken world.
Due to the scarcity of material resources (especially water) and the unpredictable climate, broken world societies periodically face population bottlenecks where not everyone can survive. They must therefore institute survival lotteries -bureaucratic procedures that determine who lives and who dies. And no broken world society will endure unless most citizens regard its actual survival lottery as (at least reasonably) just. A central concern of broken world ethics is thus to design a just survival lottery.
'Survival lottery' is a term of art. It may not involve any actual lottery. For instance, a libertarian survival lottery might simply consist of a collective decision to allow the 'natural' distribution of survival-chances to remain uncorrected. However, broken world liberals, egalitarians, or contractualists, who all seek a fair redistribution of the burdens imposed by scarce resources and chaotic climate, probably do need literal lotteries. (For instance, a Rawlsian survival lottery must fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of both social cooperation and the natural lottery.)
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Broken world dwellers must be prepared to countenance trade-offs between lives.
They must also be willing to sacrifice present basic needs to preserve or enhance their society's capacity to meet future basic needs. In a world of declining resources, a sustainable survival lottery cannot always privilege the present over the future.
Any adequate broken world moral outlook must therefore include a willingness to contemplate survival lotteries, to ask which possible survival lotteries are more just, and to endorse an existing survival lottery if (but only if) it is reasonably just. Familiar
Millian utilitarian arguments about the desirability of broad participation in the design of political institutions are especially compelling in a broken world (Mulgan 2011, 133-147 (Mulgan 2011, 56-68, 113-122, 185-197; 2014c; 2015c) . This is why the broken world is so ethically unsettling. It is also why we must take broken futures seriously: if our descendants will inherit a world where they must think the unthinkinable, then we do them no favours if we also bequeath a moral outlook that prevents them from thinking it. Indeed, our reluctance to countenance trade-offs may itself contribute to a broken future. The longer we refuse to countenance intergenerational survival lotteries, the harsher such lotteries must be once they are (inevitably) introduced.
The best moral outlook for a world of enduring favourable conditions is thus ideal, neither in a broken world, nor even in an affluent present where favourable conditions are under threat. In the former, it offers no advice; while in the latter, it preserves an unsustainable status quo too long, thus spreading the inevitable cost inequitably across the generations.
Post-scarcity futures.
If future people face a broken future, then we must radically rethink our ethical teaching. If we knew the future was broken, we would at least know how to proceed.
But this future is not inevitable. Indeed, some possible futures are quite the opposite.
Imagine instead a post-scarcity world where some new technology has removed all conflicts over resources. Perhaps nanotechnology has produced 'Cornucopia machines' capable of re-assembling air molecules to create any desired object (Stross 2005) . Or perhaps future people have uploaded themselves into a digital realm, where available resources are effectively infinite relative to their digitised wants and needs.
(I explore this particular post-scarcity scenario in section 8.)
Affluent liberal society promises to meet all basic needs, but not to satisfy all desires.
Once basic needs and basic liberties are guaranteed, the primary focus of the affluent theory of justice is the distribution of resources that remain scarce relative to desires.
In the broken world, the affluent promise is broken: not all basic needs can be met. In the post-scarcity world, the affluent limitation is removed: desires no longer conflict, because all can be met simultaneously.
In Ethics for a Broken World, some of my imaginary broken world philosophy students wonder how affluent philosophers found anything to talk about (Mulgan 2011, 135) . For those students, justice is all about the distribution of (scarce) 
Evaluative uncertainty and virtual futures.
Utilitarians seek to maximise well-being. But the nature of human well-being is a site of perennial philosophical controversy. We are unsure what makes life worth living.
Contemporary debate contrasts three positions: hedonism says well-being is pleasure and the absence of pain; preference theory says well-being is getting what you want;
and the objective list theory offers a list of things that are good in themselves irrespective of the agent's attitude to them, such as knowledge, achievement, friendship, and so on (Parfit 1984, 3-4, 493-502; Fletcher, 2013; Crisp 2015) .
There are two ways that rule utilitarians might address this pervasive disagreement.
The exclusivist picks her favourite theory of well-being and ask what maximises that.
The agnostic seeks the ideal code that maximises whatever makes life worth living.
She trusts that, in practice, preference, pleasure, and objective value all coincide and the same ideal code maximises well-being whatever well-being turns out to be.
Unfortunately, exclusivism and agnosticism both come unstuck when we consider possible futures where nuances of well-being really matter. Suppose some not-toodistant future generation must choose between broken and post-scarcity futures. But there is a catch. The latter must be a virtual future where people abandon the real world altogether and spend their entire lives plugged into an experience machine that perfectly simulates any possible human experience. This virtual reality is all anyone has ever known, and they find it perfectly satisfactory.
How should we think about the choice between broken and virtual futures? How do we want future people to think about that choice? On its own terms, the virtual world is more abundant than any affluent reality (past or present), and certainly better than any broken world. But should those terms be accepted? IMOU asks: How should we teach the next generation to think about such choices?
My virtual future is modelled on Robert Nozick's famous experience machine (Nozick 1974, 42-45) . Like all good thought experiments, it works by prizing apart things that typically go together. When pleasure is entirely cut adrift from achievement, which matters more? Nozick's discussion is tantalizingly brief, and his dialectical purpose is unclear. However, one popular interpretation presents Nozick's thought experiment as a reductio ad absurdum of hedonism (Feldman 2011) .
Elsewhere, following Nozick, I argue that the objective list theory has a decisive advantage over both hedonism and preference theory in relation to virtual futures (Mulgan 2014a (Mulgan , 2014b remain agnostic, assuming that the same moral outlook will maximise pleasure and preference-satisfaction and objective goods. But it would be reckless, given our philosophical uncertainty, to select one account of well-being and simply seek to maximise that. If we select the wrong account, then our 'ideal' moral outlook could be very sub-optimal indeed.
Liberals (including liberal rule utilitarians) argue that the best moral outlook for an affluent present is neutral between competing stories about the good life. They thus hope to avoid the dangers of presupposing the wrong theory of well-being. But a neutral outlook could prove disastrous or unworkable in the face of a virtual future.
How can we remain neutral when so much is at stake?
It is hard to find the best moral outlook for the choice between broken and virtual futures. But now suppose, instead, that a virtual future is inevitable. (Perhaps the world becomes so bleak that there is no other choice. Or perhaps we cannot now hope to influence that future decision.) How can we best prepare future people for the choices they will face within their virtual world? It is not obvious that the best moral outlook for the choice whether to enter a virtual future is also best for life within that future. For instance, suppose we are objectivists about well-being. Faced with the prior choice, objectivism stresses the importance of what could be irretrievably lost in an experience machine. But once the virtual future is inevitable, and especially once it has already arrived, objectivism aims instead to preserve genuine values in a purely virtual environment -and to find more nuanced ways to distinguish one virtual (substitute) good from another.
Once again, what we should emphasize in our ethical
teaching depends on what challenges we expect future people to face.
Digital futures.
Another possible instantiation of the post-scarcity future is a digital future where flesh-and-blood humans have been replaced by digital beings -intelligent machines and/or digital copies of human brains (Mulgan 2014a (Mulgan , 2016b And what is the best moral outlook for life within a digital future? As in the virtual future, these questions can easily come apart. Perhaps the sensitivities needed to choose whether to upload (or how to go digital) differ from those needed to take advantage of all the opportunities available within any given digital future.
One especially disturbing prospect is an unconscious digital future, where both intelligent machines and digital humans lack any phenomenological experience, inner life, or 'qualia'. Unconscious digital futures are credible. Consciousness might be simply a matter of patterns of information processing -something machines could easily share. But it might instead be an emergent feature specific to our biology. probably regard consciousness -'whatever that is!' -as unimportant. If they take over, they may remove consciousness without thinking twice.) This is a new ethical predicament, because no credible future raises analogous doubts about other expansions of ethical concern. We don't have similar worries that animals will turn out not to be sentient, for instance.
Virtual and digital futures both require sensitivity to questions about value. But they require different kinds of sensitivity and involve different risks. The best moral outlook for the former is unlikely to be ideal for the latter.
Predictable and unpredictable futures.
My final contrastive pair of possible futures concerns the predictability of human behaviour. Imagine a predictable future where (perhaps thanks to computer models exploiting big data), future actions can be predicted as reliably as any past action could ever be discovered. Any third-party, and perhaps even the person herself, can be as confident at t2 that A will do X at t3 as she could ever be that A did Y at t1. This is a prima facie credible future. Even if prediction is in its infancy, it seems premature to rule it out on empirical grounds. 10. An imaginative moral outlook.
My goals in this paper have been to introduce ideal moral outlook utilitarianism, to emphasise the need for utilitarians to think more clearly about the future, and to Ideally, we want to identify the IMO without first resolving our uncertainty about well-being or metaphysics. My solution relies on one specific claim about moral progress. I assume that we could produce a next generation whose moral sensitivity and moral imaginativeness were significantly greater than our own, and whose judgements about value and well-being were much more finely-nuanced than ours. If we teach a moral outlook that emphasises moral imaginativeness, then we can reasonably expect to produce a next generation of (comparative) moral experts. is what we officially do, and 'the next generation' is our current cohort of students.
(Similar restrictions might apply if 'we' are people developing public education policies, etc.) However, these restricted IMOUs are not our primary interest in this paper.
iii Problematic boundary cases may still emerge. (What about people in the distant future whose moral outlook is formed directly by viewing Michael Sandel's lectures on justice on some future incarnation of YouTube, for instance?) But I propose to set these aside here.
iv IMOU has richer resources to deal with partial compliance than any existing rule utilitarianism, because it does not idealize to full compliance among the next generation at all. We idealize our teaching, not their response to that teaching -and certainly not their subsequent behaviour. The IMO is chosen because of how it would actually be implemented by real human beings. This prevents it from becoming too idealistic. Anyone who has internalized the IMO will therefore be well-equipped to respond to partial compliance, especially partial compliance with that outlook's more demanding elements. ix Not all objectivists will find value in the unconscious digital future. Some will agree with hedonists that it is a valueless void. If we endorse an experience requirement (Griffin 1986, 13; Fletcher 2013, 210) , then other list items (achievement, knowledge, friendship, preference satisfaction) only add value to a person's life if she experiences them. In a world without experience, there can be no valuable lives. There can thus be value in the unconscious digital future only if some items on our list are not subject to an experience requirement. Of course, if pleasure has any value, then worlds with flesh-and-blood humans will still retain an advantage. But unconscious digital futures are now worth something. And unconscious digital beings can then outweigh conscious competitors -if they can collectively accumulate enough valuable achievements to compensate for their lack of awareness. Given the potentially enormous achievements opened up by the digital transition, this is not out of the question.
x Predictability and freedom might also be closely linked to consciousness. Suppose consciousness must include awareness of one's own freedom. Predictable beings are thus never truly conscious. If digital beings are predictable, then every digital future is both predictable and unconscious.
xi For a taste of the current debates about free will and moral responsibility, in particular, see e.g. Fischer et al. 2007 . audiences at all four events for very helpful comments.
